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RECENT CASES
SUCCESSION TO PROPERTY FROZEN
UNDER CUBAN ASSETS CONTROL
REGULATIONS
Richardson v. Simon, 560 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1977)
Appellants, executors of an estate of a former Cuban citizen appealed
from a decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York dismissing their complaint. Appellants contended that (1) promulgation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (hereinafter, the Regulations), 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1976), was not authorized by the Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917 (hereinafter, the Act), 50 App. U.S.C. § 1, et seq.. and (2)
that the respondent, Secretary of the Treasury (hereinafter, the Secretary),
unconstitutionally deprived appellants of property in violation of the U.S.
Const. amend. V by his continued application of the Act and the Regulations appurtenant thereto.
Prior to the effective date of the Regulations, a husband and wife, residents and citizens of Cuba, owned a joint account in a New York bank. Pursuant to § 515.201 of the Regulations, the Secretary froze the assets in the account. Subsequently, the husband died intestate in Cuba and his wife, his
sole heir according to Cuban law, immigrated to the United States and established permanent residency. Pursuant to § 515.525(a)(1) of the Regulations, the Secretary granted her a license to one-half of the frozen assets.
Upon her death, her estate devised by will to her niece, a U.S. citizen.
Following the Secretary's refusal to release the remaining portion of the
frozen assets, the appellants, executors of the estate - all citizens of the
United States - sought an order directing the Secretary to release that portion of the assets which had remained frozen. The appellants appealed from
the district court's dismissal of their cause.
The case presented issues of legislative and constitutional interpretation
remarkably similar to those raised in Real v. Simon, 510 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.
1975). There the court held that since Congress did not intend § 5(b)(l)(B) of
the Act, which delegated to the Executive the power to regulate those transactions involving property in which a foreign national had an interest, to be
used to freeze assets beneficially claimed by US. citizens, § 515.525(b) of the
Regulations, which retained the decedent's interest in property transferred
by intestate succession if the decedent was a foreign national, was without
logic and not supported by the Act.
In dispensing with appellants' initial claim that § 515.525(b) was not
authorized by the Act, the Second Circuit disregarded the Real decision.
The court stated that the issue was one requiring executive or legislative expertise. This declaration of judicial deference did not, however, preclude the
court from dismissing the Legislature's expression that assets wholly or substantially owned by citizens and residents of the United States should not
remain frozen, S. Rep. No. 701, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1965]
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U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3581, 3585, nor from ignoring the Executive's
statement that even former Cuban nationals residing in the United States
should be regarded as unblocked nationals, 49 Dep't State Bull., 160 (1963).
This apparent system of selectively excluding legislative and executive
declarations enabled the court to discount appellants' initial argument that
since U.S. citizens, and not foreign nationals, were those seeking beneficial
interest in the frozen bank accounts, § 515.525(b) was inconsistent with §
5(b) of the Act.
As to appellants' second argument that even if the Regulations were
supported by the Act, the appellants were deprived of property without due
process, the court conceded that the Secretary's actions were difficult to explain in terms of promoting the purposes of the Act as identified in Sardino
v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966) and in Real.
Such an admission, however, did not dissuade the court from
suggesting possible rational bases from which the court could pronounce
satisfaction of the constitutional requirement. Though the court was correct
in asserting that it was not confined when searching for a rational basis to
those purposes the Congress enunciated when it passed the Trading with the
Enemy Act, it is curious that the "basis" the court settled on was one which,
if accurate, would have imposed only an indirect sanction upon economic
intercourse with the "enemy." The court speculated that if the basis for
maintaining frozen assets was to prevent U.S. citizens from expressing support for Cuba's policies as a quid pro quo for the receipt of assets from their
Cuban relatives, then the Act, and the Secretary's actions, were supported
by a rational basis. This possible basis for Congressional passage of the Act
provided the justification for the court's rejection of appellants' argument
that they were deprived of property without due process.
The court's reasons for affirming the district court's dismissal of appellants' request that the Secretary be ordered to release the remaining
frozen assets were not convincing. In fact, the court itself attested to the
questionable nature of its decision. While the court concluded its opinion by
alluding to the persuasive human effects of the Real decision, the Second
Circuit (sitting en banc), could not bring itself to the conclusion reached by
the Fifth Circuit in Real. Instead, the court once again deferred to the expertise of the legislative and executive branches. As the dissent pointed out, by
failing to align itself with the Real decision, the court allowed the Secretary
to perpetuate the fiction that a decedent foreign national, "though in his
grave, hovers as a Cuban national spirit over the vaults of the Bank of Nova
Scotia." Richardson, 560 F.2d at 507 (Moore, J., dissenting).
PAUL E. LINET
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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION DECISIONS
United States v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
Plaintiffs brought suit against the Consul General of the United States
at Santo Domingo, an employee of the Embassy in Santo Domingo, and a
"John Doe," for damages arising under 22 U.S.C. § 1199. Plaintiffs, A. Garcia, a citizen and resident of the United States, and J. Ortiz, a permanent
resident of the United States, alleged that the defendants acted unlawfully
and arbitrarily in denying visas to Garcia's fiance and Ortiz's spouse.
At issue was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to sue for damages under the statute because judicial review of immigration decisions is
prohibited, since the decisions are within the province of the executive and
legislative branches of government. The defendants moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that: (1) The court lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (2) the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue; (3) the court lacked
jurisdiction over the defendants; (4) the plaintiffs failed to join an indispensable party; (5) the actions were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; and (6) venue was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).
In May of 1976, A. Garcia filed a petition for a non-immigrant visa for
her fiance, E. Hernandez, a citizen and resident of the Dominican Republic,
so that the two could be married and live in the United States. When Hernandez applied at the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo for the visa, the officials questioned his intention to marry, and withheld the visa petition.
In July of 1975, L. Ortiz applied at the U.S.
Domingo for an immigrant visa to join her husband,
married in 1973. The Embassy denied the visa to Mrs.
the marriage was one of convenience for immigration

Embassy in Santo
J. Ortiz, whom she
Ortiz claiming that
purposes.

The plaintiffs alleged that the officials' conduct had been willfully
malfeasant or an abuse of power and that the defendants acted unlawfully
and arbitrarily in denying the visas. As a result of the defendant's actions,
plaintiffs alleged that they suffered emotional harm, anxiety, loss of consortium, loss of economic benefits of a martial relationship, loss of ability to
plan for the future, inordinate delays in obtaining tax benefits, unforeseen
travel, and other expenses.
The Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to bring an action for
damages against the Consul General under 22 U.S.C. § 1199. The court,
however, held that J. Heredia, an investigator employed by the Embassy,
could not be held liable under the statute since he was not a consular officer.
In asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter,
defendants claimed that the plaintiffs' suit was an attempt to circumvent the
rule that the courts cannot review decisions made by immigration officials.
The court noted that the plaintiffs were not challenging the denial of the
Visas, but rather were suing under 22 U.S.C. § 1199, which expressly allows
suits for damages. Citing the decisions in American Surety Co. v. Sullivan, 7
F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1925) and Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y.
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1976), the court concluded that plaintiffs could bring a suit for damages under section 1199 which would not constitute review of the decision by the
immigration officials.
The defendants' argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue was
quickly dismissed by the court. Defendants argued that only the persons actually denied the visas, and not their spouses or fiances, could sue under section 1199. The court, however, relied on Pena which held that a wife could
sue for damages for the denial of a visa to her husband.
The defendants challenged the court's jurisdiction over the persons of
the defendants, whether they were sued as individuals or in their official
capacity. Plaintiffs cited 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) in alleging jurisdiction. Citing
Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382 (D.C.R.I. 1977) the court construed section
1391(e) as extending jurisdiction to district courts if the parties have
minimum contacts with the United States. Since the defendants were employed by the United States, the court held that there were sufficient contacts to bring them within thejurisdiction of the court.
The eleventh amendment prohibits actions for damages against defendants in their official government capacity. The court, however, noted that
defendants could be sued as individuals under the ruling of Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Court determined that it had jurisdiction over the
consular officials since they were both being sued in their individual
capacities.
Since section 1199 pertains only to consular officials and not to all employees of the Embassy, the court dismissed the actions against defendant
Heredia, the investigator employed by the Embassy, for a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs brought the suit "in the name of the United States for the use
of the person injured (Garcia and Ortiz)" as required by section 1199.
Defendants contended that the failure to join the United States as an indispensible party (defendant) warranted dismissal. The court determined
that the plaintiffs had compiled with the requirements of section 1199, and
interpreted the statute as not requiring the United States to be joined as a
defendant.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was not a bar to the action as
suggested by the defendants. The court stated that section 1199 was a waiver
of the doctrine since it allowed suits to be brought against consular officers.
Finally, defendants attempted to have the court dismiss the action by
alleging that venue was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) since the defendants were either retired or no longer in service in the Dominican Republic.
In an action for damages, the fact that defendants have had a change in employment status is irrelevant. Following the decision in Driver, the Court
held that venue was proper against a retired official or one who has changed
his post.
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The major significance of this case is that consular officers will be reluctant to deny visas without a legitimate factual basis to uphold their decisions. Immigration decisions are still immune from judicial review and
courts will not circumvent this rule, although they will show suits for
damages to be brought against consular officers.
JAMES ROBERTSON

Editor's Note: The statute under discussion, 22 U.S.C. §1199, has been
repealed.

